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S

even years into the US-led effort to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, the mission is on the verge of failing. This unsettling new reality
is the result of key international and Afghan actors having for years pursued a narrow strategy focused almost exclusively on short-term goals at
the expense of a broader and more cohesive strategy. Afghanistan, consequently, is now plagued by a threat environment shaped and sustained by
an expanding insurgency, widespread criminality, ineffective governance,
and the absence of a coordinated response to continuing challenges. Violence inside the country has risen steadily since 2006, and in 2008 levels of
violence in Afghanistan exceeded levels of violence in Iraq.
President Barack Obama has announced that Afghanistan will be
his Administration’s top foreign policy priority, and his advisers are currently reviewing the situation with the objective of developing a strategy
that will be successful against the dynamic, highly adaptive insurgency currently ravaging the country. As part of the new strategy, the United States is
expected to deploy at least 17,000 additional forces to Afghanistan over the
next 12 months in a “surge” designed to regain momentum and provide the
breathing room necessary for the development of governance and security
capacity in the country. International and domestic actors are also expected
to explore peace talks with reconcilable insurgents, engage Afghan tribes
and local communities in providing for their own security, and attempt to
forge regional cooperation in their pursuit of a new comprehensive strategy.
These approaches will permit international and domestic leaders to
begin to address the security decline, but only if they are reinforced by an
effective and accountable Afghan government capable of providing the rule
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of law and security for its citizens. Such a government will be an effective
partner of its neighbors and the international community, and will be in a
position to stabilize the region so that it cannot again become a base for
regional and global terrorists. The establishment of this type of Afghan government should be at the heart of any new strategy for the country. In formulating a new strategy, international and domestic leaders need to commonly
articulate the end-state envisioned in Afghanistan and tailor their preferred
means—a “surge,” national reconciliation talks, and regional compromises—to achieving those ends. During the last seven years international actors and the Afghan government have lacked a clear common vision of the
Afghanistan they have been striving to build and thus have tended to pursue
incremental policies or undertake tactical efforts, undermining long-term
priorities.
The absence of a shared vision for Afghanistan has blurred the distinction between means and ends. Means have too often defined goals, tactics
too often driven strategy, supply too often determined demands, and shortterm necessities too often took precedence over long-term priorities. This
failed vision has also led many to question whether the US-led operation is
aimed at securing Afghanistan, reshaping the whole of South Asia, or simply setting the conditions for a responsible exit plan. American policymakers have undertaken several assessments of their Afghanistan strategy since
last summer, and nearly all have found that the United States and the rest of
the international community are guilty of setting unrealistic or shortsighted
goals for the nation. In light of the current situation, the United States needs
to take the lead in developing policies designed to reinforce any long-term
stability in Afghanistan. These policies should be focused, coherent, and
shared by all the actors, and they need to be targeted at freeing Afghanistan
from the vicious cycle of insecurity, insurgency, impunity, and corruption in
which it is trapped. Any continuation of the shortsighted efforts of the past
seven years will lead international actors and the Afghan government to
certain failure. This article looks at specific strategic challenges facing Afghanistan and presents ways in which leaders might transition to sustainable
policies that will make peace and stability realistically obtainable.

Ali A. Jalali was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. He now serves as a Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
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President Barack Obama said Afghanistan will be
his Administration’s top foreign policy priority.

The Challenge, Vision, and Strategy
Since 2001 the situation in Afghanistan has evolved from a relatively simple post-conflict setting into a complex threat environment marked by
terrorism, insurgency, and the many challenges of nation-building. Its everincreasing complexity has perplexed the Afghan government and contributing nations and stymied the development of any unified, long-term vision
for the nation and its people. All parties have approached the emerging issues in divergent, uncoordinated ways, with operations on every front being
fragmented reactions to events rather than strategic undertakings designed
to support long-term goals. Militarily, for instance, US troops narrowly focused on fighting terrorists in Afghanistan after the Taliban was removed
from power, even though many realized that numerous terrorists had already
snuck across the border to Pakistan. Other NATO members restricted their
contributions in terms of manpower and resources to peacekeeping operations despite the fact that peace had not yet been achieved. The Chairman of
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, neatly summarized
the challenges facing the international community in Afghanistan when he
told the US Congress in 2007 that “in Iraq, we do what we must . . . . In
Afghanistan, we do what we can.”1 The Obama Administration is expected
to support “what must be done” in Afghanistan, but what will such support look like? Before it can be defined, we must ask what Afghans, the
United States, and the international community envision as the end-state in
Afghanistan. What are their long-term goals, and how can these goals be
achieved in a reasonable timeframe?
President Obama’s Administration sees the resurgence of al Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan as “the greatest threat” to US
security. It seeks to counter this threat by increasing the force levels in Afghanistan, investing more resources in an effort to revitalize Afghanistan’s
economic development, and helping Pakistan secure the border region with
Afghanistan.2 Meanwhile, there are numerous suggestions inside and outside the Obama Administration to scale back US objectives in Afghanistan
and begin focusing more narrowly on preventing the nation from being a
safe haven for al Qaeda, ensuring regional stability rather than trying to
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build a centralized democratic state in Afghanistan.3 Lessons from the past
several years and ground realities, however, indicate that there is not any
short cut to achieving strategic goals. Despite the emerging doubts about the
feasibility of creating a centralized democratic state, building a legitimate
and stable government that can control its territory and command the trust
of Afghan citizens is the key to realizing the Obama Administration’s vision. Obviously, Afghanistan—a poverty-stricken country which has been
devastated and fragmented by a long period of war and violence—cannot be
turned into a “Jeffersonian democracy” or a “Central Asian Valhalla” in the
foreseeable future. But a minimalist approach narrowly focused on rooting
out militant strongholds in Pakistan and gaining short-term local successes
in Afghanistan can hardly fulfill the stated vision.4 During the past seven
years, failure to stabilize Afghanistan under a functional government has
been rooted in poorly resourced and badly coordinated efforts, not because
of the infeasibility of the mission. Long-term stability in Afghanistan can be
achieved only through efforts directed toward changing the divisive situation rather than adopting solutions solely to accommodate the existing fragmentation based on temporary gains. Accommodation of traditional power
structures and various ethnic groups has to be pursued through democratic
participation, political and economic integration, and the development of a
civil society and private sector that mitigate the negative impacts of competing group interests.
Afghanistan’s complex threat environment has necessitated that
Afghan and international forces simultaneously tackle the challenges of
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-building. Unfortunately,
all countries present in Afghanistan have tended to individually define the
parameters of their participation, which has prohibited the development of
a unified vision and often set well-intentioned partners at cross purposes. A
case-in-point can be seen in the lack of international cooperation in implementing the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and related policy directives. The ANDS, which received international approval
at the Paris Conference in June 2008, envisions Afghanistan as “a stable
Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors” by
2020.5 An earlier White House paper defined US objectives in Afghanistan
in terms of helping “the people of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and
establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights
of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in the
War on Terror.”6 Afghan and international operations have not sufficiently
served these visions. Many actors have refused to sufficiently invest in the
security, political, and economic institutions that are necessary to underpin
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A favorable political-strategic environment in and
around Afghanistan is a prerequisite to beginning
reconciliation with local insurgents.

the objective of a stable democracy toward which they claim to be working.
In a state that was decimated by decades of war, merely holding elections
will not ensure stability.
Afghanistan is currently at a tipping point where its government’s
legitimacy (and that of its international backers) is being openly challenged
by an array of antigovernment forces. The Taliban has long operated a shadow government in Afghanistan’s most dangerous areas, and its power now
reaches to Kabul’s doorstep. Most Afghans do not view the insurgents as a
viable alternative to the current government, but they are reluctant to stand
up to them on behalf of a government that can neither protect its citizens
nor deliver basic services. As a result, most Afghans are sitting on the fence,
waiting to see which side will prevail. Recent polls indicate that Afghans are
most affected by insecurity, unemployment, the high price of staple goods,
the struggling economy, and corruption,7 so it is incumbent upon the central
government and its international partners to develop a strategic approach
that responds to these demands.
In developing such a strategy, Afghan society needs to be mobilized
in pursuit of what its population aspires to instead of what a supply-driven
assistance program imposes upon it. Many have debated whether such mobilization should be driven by the central government in a top-down approach
or by local organizations in a bottom-up approach. In reality, both approaches
have been tested, and both should be utilized as the situation in Afghanistan
is moved forward. The Bonn process initiated a bottom-up approach by allowing regional strongmen and warlords to help overthrow the Taliban. The
decentralization it created was in turn meant to be checked by the 2004 Afghanistan constitution, a document that empowered the central government
to proceed from the top-down. Today, there is a need to balance power harmoniously between the center and the periphery. Ideally, the Afghan central
government would take the initiative in fighting insurgents, building critical
infrastructure, and reforming corrupt national institutions while community
organizations would take the lead in driving local-level economies, delivering services, and conducting dispute resolution. This type of melding of
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national and local endeavors would ingratiate the Afghan government to its
people and serve as a pillar of human security in Afghanistan.
Establishing the rule of law that serves the Afghans is as important
as establishing the roots of individual security and will necessitate the overhauling of a heretofore failed Afghan government. The United States and
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan never gave serious
attention to making the government work and have repeatedly ignored its
inefficiencies and corruption. It is now clear that the government’s deficiencies and its over-reliance on foreign support have alienated the Afghan population and undermined Afghanistan’s fragile stability. Plans to reform the
civilian administration will be difficult to accomplish, as government officials are inadequately trained, poorly paid, and unaccountable to the people
they govern. Those in Kabul who are invested in such a dysfunctional system will resist any policies that will allow provinces and local communities
to take the initiative in the country’s governing.
Governance has to embody the use of institutions, structures of authority, and resources to manage society’s problems and affairs. It entails
control and coordination of activities. Therefore, effective governance is
underpinned by the state’s legitimacy and its long-term stability and capacity to deliver. Governance is hampered by its lack of control over resources,
institutions, and procedures that facilitate change in the country. Kabul is
not in full control of institution-building, security operations, and development choices. The basic functions of governance are performed by an array
of state and nonstate actors, including foreign militaries, international bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and informal domestic power holders.
The state has even deferred the “monopoly of legitimate use of force” to
foreign actors in the hope that under the security cover of foreign militaries
they will rebuild the state amid an unstable environment. While such a pattern is not uncommon in post-conflict and developing states, the slow pace
of nation-building in Afghanistan inhibits efficiency in governance, security, and economic development. Consequently, without the state playing a
central role, public goods contributed by different actors tend to be uncoordinated, unstable, transient, and more supply-driven than demand-driven.
This situation perpetuates and compounds the crisis.8
The delivery of services and waging effective reconstruction efforts
need to aim at reducing poverty and deprivation while at the same time presenting an Afghan government involved in developmental efforts. These
efforts should lead to tangible changes in the lives of ordinary Afghans. The
peoples’ sustainable access to roads, electricity, water, and other services generates a strong political impact that wins support and contributes to the isola10
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tion and eventual defeat of the insurgency. Development of agriculture and
rural economies should be given top priority in economic reconstruction.9
Another key prerequisite for winning over the people is fighting corruption and the illicit drug trade. The weak Afghan government, together
with the associated endemic violence and poverty, contributes to the growth
of the country’s illicit drug industry. Therefore, a solution that brings together the development of security, governance, the rule of law, and the
economy—the same elements that comprise a comprehensive strategy for
defeating the insurgency—needs to be sought. Massive eradication of opium poppies alone will neither help in reducing the illicit drug industry nor
defeating the insurgency.
Counternarcotic efforts are multidimensional challenges that encompass all aspects of nation-building in Afghanistan. The illicit drug industry
will disappear only when a functioning, stable, and effective Afghan state
emerges. To this end, Afghanistan should focus on development as the way
to rid itself of poppy cultivation. There are no quick and simple solutions.
Reorienting a full one-third of Afghanistan’s economy without destabilizing
the nation requires an enormous number of resources, a large administrative
capacity, and lots of time. Only a comprehensive and holistic approach will
be successful.
The planned presidential election in Afghanistan has the ability to
produce greater stability or more risk. People in Afghanistan hope that the
presidential election might bring positive changes in the direction the nation
is transiting, from instability to peace and individual security. If the people
perceive the election to be a credible, fair, and free process, the results,
whatever they may be, will lead to hope and stability. But if popular perception deems the process not credible, inaccessible to every part of the electorate, and being manipulated by the central government, influential groups, or
individuals, it may cause a greater division that will only benefit the Taliban
and other insurgent organizations. So there is a need for ensuring a level
playing field for this election, with the major candidates having equal access
to security, the media, and means to reach out to people in the unstable and
remote areas.
Individual security and good governance underpin any vision of a
peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. A big challenge remains in setting the
conditions for achieving these goals, because as much as they tout them, the
Afghan government and its international partners cannot simply will them
into being. They can, however, pursue a strategy that will provide an opportunity to forge them into being.
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Counternarcotic efforts are multidimensional
challenges encompassing all aspects
of nation-building in Afghanistan.

Military Surge—Opportunities and Challenges
The United States is planning to increase the size of its force in Afghanistan by deploying at least 17,000 additional personnel over the next
12 months. One US combat brigade already deployed in January 2008, two
others are scheduled to deploy in the spring, and one final brigade is slated
for the summer. Additionally, a number of NATO countries are expected to
provide more forces to support the “surge.” Given the increasing intensity
of the Taliban-led insurgency and the current dearth of competent security
forces able to counter it, Afghan and international leaders are correct in bolstering the military presence inside Afghanistan. The country, leaders will
shortly find, cannot be saved militarily, but can be lost if a lack of security
is allowed to flourish. The introduction of additional forces at this time will
certainly give leaders the time they need to develop the institutions capable
of driving Afghanistan forward.
The introduction of an Iraq-style surge, however, will not on its own
significantly change the situation, because Afghanistan is a complex environment in which the challenges have been compounded by years of neglect.
Afghanistan is a theme park of problems. Unlike Iraq, it has suffered from
expanding militant bases in nearby countries and been hindered by the disjointed nature of the NATO effort. A detailed strategy for the employment
of the new military forces is necessary but unlikely before April, when leaders at a NATO summit in France will address the situations in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. When addressed, US leaders expect that the new strategy and
the additional forces will allow them to combat the Taliban and al Qaeda
in such a manner as to also facilitate improved governance, while weaning
the population from the Taliban’s influence. These future operations will
be a struggle for control of territory and the people who live in it. Victories
against insurgents are meaningless unless they lead to control of the political and economic environment in which the Afghan government can begin
to govern effectively, protect the population, and deliver basic services. If
international forces are unable to provide the security necessary for the Afghan government to initiate positive changes, the Afghan population will
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come to resent the forces and resist their presence. They will associate the
forces, as they currently do, with air strikes and night raids, and will continue to grow skeptical of their ability to provide security, protection from
crime, and basic services.
The Taliban and their allies lack the capacity to win militarily, but
they have the ability to challenge international forces while at the same time
disrupting the Afghan government and turning the Afghans against both.
The insurgents will likely fight a protracted war of attrition in an attempt to
enhance their political and economic influence in as much of the country as
possible. Their strategy is based on a traditional feature of Afghan history
that can colloquially be described as “long-termism.” Quite simply, it is an
ability to outlast the patience of opposing forces. International forces can best
counter such a strategy by declaring their long-term commitment, offering
better alternatives to the Afghan people, and aiding the Afghan government
in providing security and governance.
No amount of international forces, though, will be enough to finish
the job. Competent Afghan security forces will be needed in the long-term,
so that standing up such forces should be part of any long-term strategy.
More sizeable and effective Afghan security forces than those that currently
exist will give the Afghan government the ability to consolidate gains that
international forces make and to expand the political and economic environment in which it will operate. Currently, the Afghan National Army (ANA)
is designed to expand to include 134,000 soldiers, and there are calls to enlarge it even further to 200,000 soldiers or more. There is a need to double
the size of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Such goals are commendable
but will take a great amount of time and resources. A force as large as the
one envisioned must be trained, armed, and transformed into a cohesive
national force, which can hardly be done without sufficient numbers of international trainers. Only half of the international trainers currently required
have been provided for the ANA and far less for the ANP. Addressing this
shortcoming needs to be a priority for policymakers designing the surge.
Military forces alone—whether Afghan or international—are not the
panacea to all of Afghanistan’s ills and, in fact, have the potential for worsening the current situation. Air strikes have been more common in Afghanistan
than they ever were in Iraq, resulting in numerous civilian casualties, mainly
due to the fact that the Taliban embeds itself inside communities. The relative
dearth of ground forces makes air support necessary but dangerous, because
Afghan and international forces lack the intelligence and support necessary.
Surge forces operating with heavy firepower and aggressive tactics also run
the risk of killing innocents and spurring greater public animosity in urban
Spring 2009
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and rural areas. The Afghan government and international leaders need to
revitalize a command structure that is fractured, a civil-military interface
that is broken down, and a strategic planning operation that is disjointed if
they are to minimize potential civilian casualties and the growing animosity
of the Afghan public. There is currently no unified military leadership capable of integrating the efforts of 41 international troop-contributing countries
with the civilian representative from the United Nations. Unless leaders are
capable of streamlining the military command structure and establishing
effective leadership over those responsible for civil-military coordination,
disjointed efforts will continue to undermine the international community’s
tactical efforts and the strategic goals they are designed to support.
The military surge increases the need for secure supply routes. In
the past, the level of foreign troops in Afghanistan (British forces in the
nineteenth century and Soviet forces in the twentieth) was determined by
the availability of supply lines. Currently, the strategic route that carries
about 75 percent of the supplies required by the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan passes through unstable areas of Pakistan. Recently, the route has
come under increased attack by militants between Peshawar and the Khyber
Pass, inflicting significant damage to the flow of supplies. Pakistani security forces have mounted several operations in an effort to keep the route
open. If the security situation in the area deteriorates further, however, it
could significantly impact military operations in Afghanistan. As the United
States sends thousands more forces into Afghanistan, the need for securing
alternative routes through Russia, Central Asia, and even Iran highlights the
importance of engaging regional powers in support of the new strategy.
Tribal Militias and Village Guards
The surge is likely to be supported by a new counterinsurgency tactic in which Afghan tribes will be armed to fight the Taliban, similar to how
Iraqi tribes were armed to fight militants during the “Sunni Awakening.” The
tactical plan, which is currently in the initial planning phase, is designed to
permit Afghan villagers to be proactive in procuring their own security. In
December 2008, US Ambassador William Wood explained that the lack of
Afghan and international security forces available for deployment in the rural areas necessitated that such a plan be developed. The United States will
in all likelihood implement the plan—known to Americans as the arbakai
system—primarily by means of training local leaders and equipping them
with the supplies they need to help the tribes “restore their own capacity to
protect themselves.”10
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The arbakai system is based on the concept of aiding the tribes in
standing up a group of men to function as a temporary police force, capable
of enforcing decisions made by the tribal councils, jirgas. It is presently only
practiced in Loya Paktia, the region that includes the Paktia, Khost, and Paktika provinces. In other areas of Afghanistan, tribes and local communities
employ a variety of mechanisms to ensure the implementation of decisions
by their jirgas or councils, known as shuras. Traditionally, Afghan governments have not directly engaged arbakais or similar bodies but have instead
enlisted the help of tribal or village elders to gain entrée to such groups.
Tribes and local communities in Afghanistan, whether as part of
their arbakai system or a similar mechanism, have long complemented the
central government’s efforts to enhance security. They have taken an active
role in policing in peacetime and a military function in repelling foreign
invasions and quelling domestic uprisings during times of conflict. Such
collaboration has been possible, however, only when tribes and local communities believed in the central government’s legitimacy and felt confident
that it could deliver the services required. When such confidence has been
lacking, tribes and local communities have relied on their traditional structures to survive, lending support to the groups that appeared to be politically
and militarily ascendant. In this respect, Afghanistan has historically been
no different than any other tribal society with its tribes and the government
playing the roles of the two mutually influential elements of a single system.
Violence has ravaged the Afghan system, however, and as a result the tribes
are no longer as willing to support the central government because it has
proven itself largely incapable of supporting the tribes.
Afghan and international leaders will find tribal engagement difficult
to reinitiate because many Afghan tribes have been restructured or wholly
transformed during the last 30 years. Many traditional tribal leaders were
sidelined during the previous conflicts and replaced by men with money,
guns, and links to extremist groups outside of Afghanistan. As discontent
has spread inside the country, many of these men have forged alliances with
the Taliban, criminal opportunists, and corrupt politicians, all of whom have
begun to play a role in the growing insurgency. Thus, engaging and providing arms to the tribes with such individuals in positions of influence would
be counterproductive. Recent attempts have aided the rise of warlords who
use their militias to exacerbate ethnic tensions, carry out criminal activities, and terrorize local populations. In 2006, for example, the international
community criticized the Afghan government’s effort to recruit militias to
secure the country’s border with Pakistan.11 The United States later rejected
such a plan outright because the move was seen as detrimental to nationSpring 2009
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The surge is likely to be supported by a new
counterinsurgency tactic in which Afghan tribes
will be armed to fight the Taliban, similar to the
“Sunni Awakening.”
building and the continuing effort to disarm the militias and warlords.12
Support for, or opposition to, engaging and arming local tribes or
communities is inherently grounded in the short-term interests of the parties
involved. This reality carries serious long-term consequences. For instance,
in late 2007 the Afghan government began to arm two militias of Barakzai
tribesmen in Farah province, with the intention of countering the Taliban
presence that was ravaging the area. The Barakzai, however, began to fight
their Noorzai rivals in the province, allowing the Taliban to continue to operate freely and expand its influence.13 In order to avoid such future mistakes,
the Afghan government and its international partners need to refrain from
implementing an all-inclusive tribal engagement policy, proceeding instead
on a case-by-case basis. They should introduce the program only in those
areas where traditional tribal structures are firmly intact and where tribes
can employ their own methods for denying insurgents access and enhancing
security. Both the Afghan government and its international partners should
be willing and ready to reinforce the tribes with political and military force
if necessary. In every case it needs to be an Afghan-led effort engaging the
tribes, providing incentives, and utilizing the traditional tribal authorities to
assist with community security and assistance. Arming the wrong tribe or
group could lead to the warlords returning to power.
Talking to the Taliban
The government of Afghanistan and its international partners largely agree on the need to talk to the Taliban and other insurgent groups in an
effort to achieve a lasting peace. They disagree, however, on exactly whom
they should talk to, the political costs acceptable in any negotiation, and a
vision of an integrated end-state. Talks that have been held thus far have
been fragmented and uncoordinated, lacking the transparency needed to ensure future success.
The Afghan government, for example, sought Saudi Arabia’s help in
mediating talks with the Taliban leadership in pursuit of a peace agreement.
President Hamid Karzai’s delegation and a group that included former Tal16
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iban officials met with Saudi King Abdallah in September 2008, but immediately following the meeting concluded that the Taliban’s senior leadership
signaled it was not interested in listening to what the leadership in Kabul
was offering until all foreign military forces left Afghanistan.14 President
Karzai’s later outreach to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s insurgent group was similarly unsuccessful. In both cases, the absence of a clear Afghan government
policy and transparency in the negotiating processes sowed suspicion and
skepticism in the public consciousness.
One other reconciliation program, Program-e Tahkim-e Solh, or the
“peace-building program,” has proven largely ineffective because it failed
to engage legitimate opposition leaders and groups that can deliver on the
promises they make. The program claims to have reconciled 6,000 Taliban
commanders and combatants but has led to no tangible improvement in the
nation’s security situation. The program is said to be fraught with corruption
and to have engaged many insurgents who are only interested in the financial benefits of cooperating, not in long-term reconciliation.
A favorable political-strategic environment in and around Afghanistan is a prerequisite for initiating reconciliation processes with local insurgents. The creation of such an environment will require the strengthening of
the central government’s influence in insurgency-ridden areas, the integrating
of the reconciliation process into Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency strategy,
and coordinating the efforts of all actors toward implementation. It will require that leading actors remove the incentives for insurgent groups throughout the whole of South Asia. To this end, Afghanistan and Pakistan need to
work together in harmony and with the international community in support
of local initiatives designed to enhance peace and minimize the emergence
of future disagreements.
Afghans and their international partners have unfortunately missed
a number of opportunities to create a favorable political-strategic environment and forge a grand peace with the opposition. They failed during the
Bonn process to address the root causes of the war and mistakenly excluded
the Taliban and other insurgent groups from talks. In fact, the Taliban and
other insurgent groups were defeated and demoralized during the 2001 and
2002 timeframe, and many of their leaders were ready to join the political
process in exchange for protection. The Afghan government and its international partners, however, did not present a coordinated political and security
strategy for ensuring such protection. As a result, many former Taliban combatants who chose to live peacefully were reported and imprisoned by Coalition forces. Many of these combatants then saw little alternative to joining
the armed opposition.
Spring 2009
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A strategy of talking to the Taliban and other insurgent groups is
fraught with risk and will only prolong the violence unless both the Afghan
government and the opposition demonstrate that they are willing to negotiate in good faith. In addition, the central government and its international
partners need to develop a unified and comprehensive strategy that defines
the goals of negotiations in the larger context of Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency strategy.
Regional Issues
Afghanistan’s geography has made the country vulnerable to the
spillover from various conflicts waged outside its borders. It has suffered
from others’ imperial ambitions and today suffers from regional powers fighting their battles on Afghanistan’s soil. Many regional conflicts are currently
playing themselves out in Afghanistan, including tensions and disputes between Pakistan and India, Iran and the United States, and Russia and NATO.
Today, these opposing sides need to forego their animosities and redouble
efforts to forge a comprehensive and sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
Among all of South Asia’s challenges, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan requires the most urgent attention. The unstable area
between the two countries’ border is dominated by the Pashtuns. Traditionally a moderate society, the Pashtuns have more than once been influenced
by outside actors. Recently, some Pakistani military and intelligence services have thrown their support behind the Taliban operating in the Pashtun
belt and have marginalized the area’s moderate tribal chiefs and political
leaders. This has permitted the Taliban to establish bases in the area from
which they can operate with impunity. Other groups, such as Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, the Haqqani network, and assorted drug traffickers, criminal organizations, and al Qaeda-linked foreign fighters, have
also exploited the region. The failure of the Pakistani government to address
extremism in its Pashtun tribal areas and of the Afghan government to exert
a presence in its Pashtun-dominated south and east have allowed extremists
to further destabilize both nations and the whole of South Asia.
Afghanistan and Pakistan will only succeed in eradicating their insurgencies if they work together, but unfortunately to this point the two
countries have approached the shared challenge from differing perspectives.
Afghanistan sees a national insurgency that is challenging the legitimacy of
the US-backed government in Kabul. Pakistan, on the other hand, sees a local insurgency that can be managed with a combination of military, political,
and developmental approaches. Afghanistan believes that the presence of
insurgent bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas, links that exist between insurgent
18
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Tribes and local communities in Afghanistan
have long complemented the state government’s
efforts to enhance security.

groups based there, and some Pakistani intelligence agencies drive the insurgency in Afghanistan. Pakistan, conversely, believes that the insurgency is
driven by public opposition to covert US air strikes and the ongoing offensive against the Taliban in the tribal areas. Peace will not come to either nation unless they work together to counter the insurgency that threatens them
both. Pakistan’s long-standing conflict with India related to Kashmir is fueling Islamabad’s suspicion of Indian influence in Afghanistan and driving it
to seek ways to maintain influence in Afghanistan by exploiting the presence of the Taliban in the tribal areas.
The ongoing US-Iranian antagonism casts a shadow on American
policies in Afghanistan. Tehran would like to have a tactic capable of causing problems for the United States in Afghanistan if Washington continues
to assail Iran. Iran is troubled by the increasing influence of the United States
in the region. Similarly, Russia and Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors
have their own concerns stemming from instability in Afghanistan, drug
trafficking, and the presence of NATO in the region. While a return of the
Taliban is not seen as in the interests of Iran or its northern neighbors, a
series of confidence-building measures aimed at removing suspicions could
go a long way in securing greater regional cooperation. For example, Iran
will be interested to see Washington drop its opposition to a nonaggression
pact between Kabul and Tehran, as well as making clear it does not intend
to establish long-term bases in Afghanistan.
Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid recently suggested that “the crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beyond the point where more troops will
help. US strategy must be to seek compromise with insurgents while addressing regional rivalries and insecurities.”15 They write that a United Nationsled, multilateral diplomatic initiative designed to resolve the array of issues
currently hindering the development of peace and security in Afghanistan
should be initiated as the first step toward a “grand deal.” The issues to be
addressed, they believe, should include solutions to the Kashmir dispute, integration of Federally Administered Tribal Areas into the Pakistani political
system, addressing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute, and easing the
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mutual distrust between the United States, NATO, Russia, China, and Iran.
The potential that such a “grand deal” has to reduce the level of violence in South Asia makes it attractive, but not all the issues related to the
deal’s practicality and timeframe have been addressed. One key issue remaining is that of Afghanistan paying a considerable price for the transgressions of other nations. Afghans lost during the “Great Game,” and they
suffered immensely while ejecting the Soviets from their land. Any future
deal in which Afghans will be expected to again pay such a price will be
the source of new problems. Unless the legitimate interests of the Afghan
people are guaranteed, no peace agreement will be obtainable and no stable
relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors will be possible. The whole
process has a better chance of success if Afghanistan is aided in stabilizing its government, while at the same time contributing to regional security
rather than being a source of trouble for its neighbors.
Conclusion
Afghanistan is currently at a tipping point where the government’s
legitimacy and that of its international backers is being openly challenged.
The presence of al Qaeda bases in the tribal areas along the AfghanistanPakistan border, combined with the rise of militancy in Pakistan, are sources
of increased instability, posing a security threat to the region and beyond.
President Obama has announced that Afghanistan will be his Administration’s top foreign policy priority. If that is true, the situation requires a
fundamental change in US policy and strategy to achieve any long-term
stability in Afghanistan. In contrast to the unrealistic and short-term approach of the past, the new strategy, based on a clearly defined vision, needs
to include a focused, coherent, and long-term strategy to assist Afghanistan
in transiting from a cycle of violence to one of peace by way of a deliberate
and comprehensive nation-building effort. Lessons from the past and the
realities of the present indicate that there is no short cut to achieving the
desired strategic goals. Despite emerging doubts regarding the feasibility of
creating the previously advertised democratic state in Afghanistan, building
a legitimate and stable government that can control its territory and command the trust of the Afghan people is a more realistic objective in realizing
the US Administration’s vision. A minimalist approach narrowly focused on
rooting out militant strongholds in Pakistan and achieving short-term gains
in Afghanistan can hardly fulfill the new vision.
During the past seven years, failure to stabilize Afghanistan under
a functional government has been rooted in poorly resourced and badly co-
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ordinated efforts, not solely because of the infeasibility of the announced
mission. Long-term stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved through
efforts directed at changing the divisive situation rather than adopting solutions at the local level solely to accommodate the existing fragmentation for
temporary gains. Accommodation of traditional power structures and different ethnic groups will need to be sought through democratic participation,
political and economic integration, and the development of a society and private sector capable of mitigating the negative impacts of competing groups.
Increased military forces should be used only to create the breathing space
required for building Afghanistan’s indigenous capacity for governance, the
rule of law, individual security, and the economic empowerment of the Afghan people. Meanwhile, the new strategy needs to seek ways to lower the
threat of violence by addressing the drivers of insecurity in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, while at the same time securing the legitimate interests of all regional and global parties.
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